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It;TRODlJCTION 
In order to simplify this brief, it has been separated 
into three parts. 
PART ONE deals with the constitutional delegation of 
taxing powers. That is, can the state delegate power to the 
municipality tc impose ~he 7% subdivider fee? 
PART TWO dea~s with the accounting of how West Jordan 
spent the 7 % subdivider fees. 
spend the money properly? 
That is, did the municipality 
It is important to note that the issues in Part Two are 
moot if appellant prevails on Part One. In other words, if the 
delegation of power is defective, appellant wins. 
need to analyze how the money was spent. 
There is no 
However, if appellant does not prevail on Part One, the 
court must then move or. to analyze Part Two. Thus, if the 
deleqation of taxing power is valid, the court must then analyze 
i::: the money was properly spent. In other words, it is not 
necessary for Call to prevail on both Part One and Part Two. 
Call wins the case if he can prevail on either Part One or Part 
Two. 
If Call does prevail on Part One or l'art Two, the court 
must go on to analyze the class issues of Part Three. 
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PART nm:: CONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 
POINT I 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED 
FOR THIS APPEAL. 
West Jordan argues that the constitutional issues 
have already been decided in Call I and Call II. (Respondents 
Briefatp. 7.) 
It is true that Call I and Call II dealt with 
constitutional issues. However those opinions do not say that 
West Jordan had an absolute constitutional right to impose the 
fee or tax. Rather, those opinions hold that West Jordan has a 
crualified right to impose the tax. (See Brief of J',ppellant, 
Point III.) 
After Call II was decided, Call amended the -----
complaint. (R. 339.) That amendment claims that West Jordan has 
power to impose the 7% fee only after a public hearing is held. 
The amendment further claims that no public hearing was held. 
Therefore, West Jordan does not have the qualified taxing 
power. 
It is ilxiomatic that a case can be amended after 
remand. Any new amendments received by the Court expand the 
scope of the case. Street v. Fourth Judicial District Ct., 113 
Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153. 
Constitutional Delegation 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE 
REQUIRED PUBLIC HEARING OR OF 
THE REQUIRED PARTICIPATION BY 
THE PLANNING COMMISSION 
As stated in Point I, the tax is constitutional only 
if certain procedural safeguards are met. These include a 
public hearing and preparation of the ordinance by the Plannir.g 
Commission. (See Brief of Appellant, Point I:c.) 
Call' s opening brief argues that there never was a 
public hearing or participation by the Planning Commission. 
(Brief of Appellant, Point III.) West Jordan's brief lists 
citations which supposedly support the lower court's opinion. 
West Jordan's citations are misleading and taken in bad faith. 
A. Discovery 
Curing the discovery phase, Call sent the following 
interrogatories: 
12. State whether a "public hearing" was held prior 
to promulgating Section 9-C-S(a) to City 
Ordinance 33. 
13. If your answer to No. 12 is no, state why not. 
14. If your answer to No. 
public hearing in 
identify all minutes, 
such "public hearing." 
2 
12 is yes, 
reasonable 
notes, or 
aescribe 
detail, 
memoranda 
the 
and 
of 
Constitutional Delegation 
~5. Identify and describe any conversation, meeting 
or document, wherein the Planning Commission 
prepared Section 9-C-8(a). 
IR. 7 94) 
In response, West Jordan stated: 
14. A copy of the minutes of the Council Meeting of 
January 21, 1975, at which the Ordinance was 
adopted, is attached. The consideration of the 
ordinance adopting Section 9-C-8 (a) was placed 
on the agenda which was publicized prior to that 
meeting. The meeting was open to the public, 
and the public was welcome to comment on ar.y 
item of discussion. The minutes do not 
designate the meeting as a "public hearing." 
Accordingly, the Defendant is unable to state 
whether a public hearing was held. 
(R. 835, emphasis added, compare R. 859-860.) 
As a further answer, West Jordan designated one 
meeting wherein the Planning Commission supposedly "prepared" 
the 7% ordinance. The minutes of that meeting state: 
Mr. Reeves made a motion that the 
City require from all subdivisions 
5% minimum of the total arnount of 
land to be donated to the City for 
park development, trade or sell, or 
equivalent value of money be turned 
over for it. Mrs. Schmidt seconded 
the motion. The motion carried 
with three for and two against. 
(R. 852) 
The first problem is that those minutes bear little 
resemblance to the final city ordinance. For example, the 
ordinance requires a 7% fee for parks and flood control. The 
Planning Commission had authorized 5% to be used exclusively 
for parks. More importantly, there is no evidence that the 
P~anning Conmission "prepared" that ordinance. An example of 
3 
Constitutional Delegation 
the correct procedure for preparing an cr~inance is set forth 
at R. 856. 
It is immediately obvious thu.t \'lest Jordan did not 
fairly answer the discovery requests on that issue. Theretore, 
Call made a Motion to Compel Discovery or For Default Judgment 
or For Summary Judgment. (R. 841.) The Court did not grant 
that motion. However, the Court did reverse the burrlen of 
proof as a sanction for West Jordan's failure tc make 
discovery. (See Brief of Appellant, Point IA and Appendix H.) 
B. Evidence 
i. Public Hearing 
During the evidenciary phase, West Jordan radically 
changed its theories: 
During discovery, West Jordan claimed that ~he 
January 21, 1975 City Council meeting might have been a public 
hearing. (R. 859.) When testimony was presented, \·/est Jordan 
changed its theory. West Jordan relied instead on a meetinc of 
August 27, 1974. Call made a timely objection to the 
testimony. (R. 1657-1658.) 
However, the August 27, 1974 meeting had nothing at 
all to do with the subdividers 7% fee. (City Ordinance 33.) 
The August 27, 1974 meeting dealt exclusively with the proposed 
new master plan of the city. (R. 1656-1658.) 
4 
Cc~st1tut1onal Delegation 
It is true that one topic at the public hearing was 
the general, "concepts of flood control and reservation of land 
for parks and recreation." (R. 1659, Lines 9-10.) It is alsc 
true that in answer to one question, a city official, 
"explained that each developer must take care of his own flood 
water . (R. 1661, Lines 8-9.) 1 Howe.ver, even accepting 
all of that evidence in the light most favorable to West 
Jordan, there is still not one iota ot evidence that a public 
hearing was advertised anc held for the purpose of approving an 
ordinance requiring subdividers to contribute 7% to be used for 
flood control and parks. 
ii. Planning & Zoning 
During the evidenciary phase, West Jordan relied on 
a single meeting of the Planning Co=ission. (R. 1670-1673.) 
However, as stated above, those minutes have no~hing to do with 
the 7% subdivider fee for flood control and parks. Those 
meetings concerned a proposed 5% fee for parks. It is 
interesting to note that the conclusion of the Planning 
Commission was: 
.. there is no legal basis for this. 
We can only recommend and suggest that 
this be given, but the developer can 
reject it. (R. 1672-1673.) 
In addition to the minutes cited above, West Jordan 
produced the former city attorney as a witness. In its brief, 
l/ The entire Master Plan is included at R 673. Obviously, 
the tlaster Plan talks in general terms about the desirability 
o t 1 lood cont ro 1 and parks. However, thei:e is no hint of 
taxing subdividers to pay for those improvements. 
5 
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West Jordan relies strongly on the followina testimony from the 
city attorney: 
In this particular instance, again from 
memory, when the ordinance was first 
drafted it would have been sent to 
Planning & Zoning for their review as 
well, and after whatever recommendations 
they would have made it would have come 
up with the City Council where it would 
have been discussed again. And if 
further revision was necessary, further 
revision would be made, and finally 
passed by the City Council. 
(Respondent's Brief, at p. 22; 
Compare R. 1644.) 
However, West Jordan takes this testimony completely 
out of context in an attempt to mislead the Court. The 
complete colloquy is as follows: 
Mr. DeBry: I have no objection 
. for the purpose of showing what 
his general custom and practice was or 
the method in which they transacteo 
business, but I do object c.nd move to 
strike the testimony if it comes in as 
his recollection, because he says he 
doesn't know what happened. 
THE COURT: He doesn't know specifically 
the dates and time because its some time 
ago but he is now reconstructing this 
based on the general practice. And I'm 
admitting this testimony for that 
general purpose only. 
(R. 1644-1645.) 
C. Summary 
Call' s opening brief claimed that there was no 
evidence at all of a public hearing or that the ordinance was 
prepared by the Planning Commission. West Jordan's brief 
listed a number of citations to support the opposite position. 
(Respondent's Brief, at pp. 19-20.) West Jordan relies on R. 
1548, 1555, 1559-60, 1642, 1646-49, 1653, 16 7 2. 
6 
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t1one of those citations support West Jordan's 
position. Some actually contradict West Jordan. The citations 
are devoid of merit. Here is an analysis of West Jordan's 
citations on the public hearing issue: 
1548 
1555 
1559-60 
1642 
1646-49 
1653 
1672 
This concerns a Commission 
meeting, not a "public hearing". 
This indicates the committee 
received input from citizens who 
were acquaintances of the 
officials, not from 
a public hearing. 
The City's witness actually 
said he did not recall if there was 
specific public meeting held on the 
ordinance. 
The City Attorney testified that it 
was he that "prepared" the 
ordinance. 
Does not support any part of the 
finding. 
Deals with a Commission meeting, 
not a "public hearing". 
Does not support any part of the 
finding. 
Obviously none of those citations remotely support 
West Jordan's position. 
7 
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POINT III 
THERE IS NO EV:DENCE THAT 
THE CITY IS SUBSIDIZHlG 
FLOOD CONTROL AND PARKS 
West Jordan tells us that $525, 000. 00 was collected 
from developers. 2 Next, West Jordan says that the City 
actually spent $1,200,000.00 for flood control and parks. 
Thus, West Jordan argues that the developers have nothing to 
complain about. Indeed, West Jordan claims that the 
subdividers get a "subsidy" from the City. West Jordan's 
argument goes like this: 
..• The City spent more ... than it 
took in. This difference was made up by 
a "subsidy" from other general revenue 
sources of the City ... This, however, 
does not show that the fee was 
"unreasonable." If anything, it shows 
the fee was "more than reasonable" and 
that the developers were being 
subsidized. 
Respondent's Brief, at p. 12. 
~I Throughout this brief, we will use the figure of 
$525, 000. 00. However, the true figure is substantially 
higher. $525,000.00 represents the cash contribution. In 
addition, the cash subdividers have contributed approximately 
26.332 acres of land. (See Exhibits 8 and lfi.) That land was 
typically valued at $15,000.00 per acre (See Exhibit lO STORM 
SEWER FUNDING.) Thus, the combined totals for cash 
($525,000.00) plus land ($394,980.00) would be $919,980.00. 
In addition to land and cash, some subdividers contributed 
materials and labor. (See Exhibit 8.) It appears that no 
attempt has been made to account for those donations. 
8 
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That argurnent is a "red herring." However it is an 
import&nt "red herring" that deserves a suitable funeral. We 
can best demonstrate the fallacy by looking at a few examples: 
Eyample No. l. 
Suppose chat all of the 
north side cf the City. Suppose 
"oldtimers" lived on the 
that the "oldtirners" had 
a<lequate flood control and park facilities. Suppose there was 
no outstanding debt on those ncrthside parks and flood control 
proJects. 
side of 
Suppose that the "newcomers" a:i.l move 
town. Suppose that the south side 
to the south 
of town is 
completely undeveloped and requires flood control and parks. 
Suppose that the cost of the flood control and parks for the 
south side is $1,200,000.00. 
If we assume all of these facts to be true, West 
Jordan's argument is correct. The impact of the new 
subdivisions was $1,200,000.00. The "newcomers" paid 
$525,000.00 of that amount. The balance could be seen as a 
"subsidy" of sorts coming from the general fund. 
Example No. 2. 
Suppose that all of the "oldtimers" live on the north 
side cf the City. Suppose that the "oldtimers" have no 
existing flood control or park system. (This was probably the 
case. 8ee plaintiff's Exhibit 10 "Storm Sewer System.") 
Suppose the "oldtimers" want to develop flood control and parks 
on their north side of the City. Suppose the cost of that: 
project is $1,200,000.00. 
9 
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Suppose that the "newcomers" all move in to thP south 
side of town. Suppose that the south side of town has nu 
immediate need for flood control or parks. Suppose that 
"newcomers" contribute $525,000.00 which is used to construct 
parks and flood control on the northside of town. 
If w_e assume all of these facts to be true, the 
"newcomers" receive no subsidy at all. In fact, the reverse is 
true. The "newcomers" (who live on the south side of town), 
are actually subsidizing flood control and park proJects for 
the "oldtimers" (who live on the northside of town). 
Summary 
The City argues that the subdividers are receiving a 
subsidy. That is certainly a possibility. However, it is 
equally possible that the subdividers are ~ out a subsidy. 
Whether the subdividers are paying or receiving a subsidy 
depends upon numerous factors which are not in evidence. Those 
factors will be developed in Point IV, below. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT HAS GIVEN 
A FORMUIA TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER ANY SUBSIDY IS 
PAID 
Point I, above, sets out some fairly simple examples. 
The "oldtimers" all live on the north side of town. The 
"newcomers" all move in on the south side of town. The parks 
and flood control are all built on the south side--or the north 
side--of town. Of course, the case would be very easy if the 
facts were so simple. 
10 
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However, in real life the facts are more complex. 
"Oldtimers" probably live on both the north side and the south 
side. "Newcomers" probably move in on the north side as well 
as the south sice. Old flood control systems probably service 
some "oldtimers" as well as some "newcomers." Those old flood 
control systems are probably partly paid for. New flood 
control systems probably cut across "oldtirner" neighborhoods 
and "newcomer" neighborhoods. 
Thus, the issue in this case is how to measure the 
flood control or recreational impact where new neighborhoods 
crowd into existing neighborhoods. Further, how can the costs 
of new flood control and parks be fairly apportioned between 
those old neighborhoods and the new neighborhoods? 
Fortunately, this Court has already decided that 
exact issue. There is no need to re-plow the ground. This 
Court has given the test. In order to fairly apportion the 
expenses (between "oldtimers" and "newcomers"), it is necessary 
to consider the factors in the following test: 
1. The cost of existing capital facilities; 
2. The manner of financing existing capital facilities; 
3. The relative extent to which the newly developed 
properties and the other properties in the 
municipality have already contributed to the cost of 
existing capital facilities; 
4. The relative extent to which the 
properties and other properties in 
will contribute to the cost of 
facilities in the future; 
newly developed 
the municipality 
existing capital 
S. The extent to which the newly developed properties 
are entitled to a credit because the municipality is 
11 
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requiring their developers or owners co provide 
corrunon facilities that have been provided by thP 
municipality and financed through general taYation or 
other means in other parts of the municipality; 
6. Extraordinary costs, if any, in servicing the newly 
developed properties; 
7. The time price differential inherent in 
comparisons of amounts paid at different times. 
fair 
See Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981). 
"If properly applied, those seven factors should put che 
new homeowner on essentially the same basis as the average 
existing homeowner with respect to costs borne in the past and 
to be borne in the future, in comparison with benefits already 
received and yet to be received." Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 
P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982). 
follows: 
The City's entire case might be surrunarized as 
The City spent $1,200,00G.OO for 
flood control and parks; 
$675,000.00 of that amount came 
from general revenue; 
$525,000.00 of that amount came 
from subdividers. 
Therefore: The subdividers 
received a subsidy. 
However, it is simply impossible to reach that 
conclusion based upon the data provided on in this record. 
Unless the Banberry test is followed, it is impossible to know 
whether the "newcomers" are subsidizing the "oldtirners", or 
vice versa. 
12 
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This case is identical to Lafferty v. Payson City, 
642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982). In Lafferty, the trial court 
approved certain connection fees for water, sewer and 
electricity. The basis of the trial court's opinion was that, 
"In each case, the per-unit costs were substantially in excess 
of the amount of the connection fees.• 642 P.2d at 378. Of 
course, that is the identical argument which West Jordan has 
rr.ade 3 This Court easily rejected those arguments. This 
Court held that all of the seven tests of Banberry must be 
considered. 
In summary, West Jordan had the burden of producing 
evidence. West Jordan did not produce evidence to satisfy the 
Banberry test. Thus, West Jordan has failed to satisfy its 
burden, and it must lose. 
POINT V 
WEST JORDAN HAS THE BURDEN OF 
PRODUCING THE DATA REQUIRED IN 
THE BANBERFY TEST. 
Call's opening brief argued that West Jordan had the 
burden of producing that evidence for three separate reasons. 
(See Brief of Appellant, at p. 4). West Jordan responded that: 
3/ 
The problem with this argument is that 
defendant did satisfy this 
West Jordan's argument goes like this: 
Certainly the inability to express an opinion would perhaps 
be critical if the City spent less on such projects than it 
took in from developers. But, that is not the case here; the 
City spent more--hundreds of thousands of dollars more--than it 
took in. Respondents Brief, at p. 12. 
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has 
burden .. The defendant d1d explain 
the reason "why" the fee was exacted and 
"where" the monies were spent . 
Respondent's Brief, at p. 15 
We will therefore examine what evidence West Jordan 
produced--what evidence West Jordan claims it has 
produced--and what evidence West Jordan has not produced: 
1. West Jordan has produced evidence to show that 
$1,200,000.00 was spent on capital projects; 
2. West Jordan has produced evidence t0 show that 
$675,000.00 of~at amount came from general revenue 
sources; 
3. West Jordan claims that $5~5,000.00 of that amount 
came from subdivider fees. However, there is r.o 
evidence at all to support that argument. (See Point 
IV, above. l 
At the risk of being tedious, we will now list the 
evidence that was not produced: 
4. West Jordan has not produced any evidence, to show 
"the cost of existing capital facilities." 
5. West Jordan has not produced evidence to shew, "the 
manner of financirlg""""existing capital facilities." 
6. West Jordan has not produced evidence to show, "the 
relative extent--to which the newly developen 
properties and the other properties in the 
municipality have already contributed to the cost of 
existing capital facilities." 
7. West Jordan has not produced evidence to show, "the 
relative extent--to which the newly de\·eloped 
properties and other properties in the municipality 
will contribute to the cost of existing capital 
facilities in the future." 
8. West Jordan has not produced evidence to show, "the 
extent to whlch "the newly developed properties are 
entitled to a credit because the municipality is 
requiring their developers or owners to provide 
common facilities that have been provided by ~he 
municipality and financed through general taxation or 
other means in other parts of the municipality. 
The /Cccountina 
9. West Jordan has not produced evidence to show, 
"extraordinary-COst~ if any, in servicing the newly 
developed properties." 
10. West Jordan has not produced evidence to show, "the 
time price dCTferential inherent in fair comparisons 
of amounts paid at different times." 
Banberry, Id at p. 904. 
In summa r,,, West Jordan has produced some evidence. 
However, West Jordan has left most of the questions unanswered. 
Until all of these questions are answered by Wes~ Jordan, it is 
impossible for any conclusions to be drawn. Lafferty v. Payson 
City, 642 P.2d 376. Indeed, unless all of the questions are 
answered, it is entirely possible that the "newcomers" have 
paid $525,000.00 for improvements to be used primarily for the 
benefit of the "oldtimers." 
POINT VI 
THE SEVEN PERCENT SUBDIVIDERS 
FEE IS ILLEGAL, AS I7 WAS 
USED FOR GENERAL REVENUE 
MEASURES. 
Call' s opening brief argued that the seven percent 
fee was used as a general revenue measure. (Brief of Appellant, 
Point IV.) Of course, it would be illegal to use the money as 
a general revenue measure. Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 
376, 378 (Utah 1982). 
west Jordan replies that the money was not used as a 
general revenue measure at all. West Jordan argues that the 
money was all used for flood control or parks. 
says: 
The evidence showed no expenditures were 
made, except for the specified purposes: 
flood control and parks. 
Respondent's Brief, at p. 16. 
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A. The $525,000.00 was Illegc.lly Intermingled with the 
General Fund, and it is no Longer Possible to T1ace 
the Funds. 
The $525,000.00 received from subdivider fees was 
deposited in the general fund and intermingled with other 
revenues. In so doing, West Jordan has violated state law: 
The City has recorded these transactions 
as year-to-year revenue and 
expenditures, and has not given them 
special accounting treatment. 
With the guidance of 
paragraphs (2), (4) and (9) of Sections 
10-10-29 [Utah Code Ann.], I conclude 
that the fees should have had special 
accounting treatment . 
Initial Re~ort of Master, pp. 8-9 
(Appendix D 11 to Brief of Appellant.) 
Because the accounts were not properly segregated, it 
is impossible to trace the funds. Both Call's expert and the 
master agree that they cannot trace where or how the 
$525,000.00 was spent. (R. 1728-1729) and (Brief of 
Appellant, Appendix D, at pp. 5 and 6). 
West Jordan totally ignores this failure to properly 
keep accounting records. West Jordan assumes that the 
$1,200,000.00 spent for flood control includes the $525,000.00 
subdivider fees. Indeed, Judge Dee makes the following 
finding: 
Even though the individual dollars paid 
by the Plaintiffs cannot be individually 
traced through the accounting records, 
the Court finds from a preponderance ot 
the evidence that the monies were spent 
on flood control projects and parks and 
recreation areas for which the impact fee 
was assessed. 
(R. 1496, at paragraph 11.) 
16 
The Accountin9 
The problem with this finding is that there is no 
/j/t,V11.lrill-~AMa~~ 
testimony at all to support it. r .... Here I £1..i.u:i:..:Gp;i.i" testified 
that the money cannot be traced. Judge Dee not only rejects 
their testimony--he goes on to trace the funds.1 We are not 
aware that Judge Dee is qualified, as an accounting expert, to 
form such opinions. Certainly, he has not described the 
accounting theories upon which he has rested his opinion. Nor, 
has West Jordan put forth any testimony at all on how to trace 
the funds. 
B. According to West Jordan's own accounting, the 
$525,000.00 was Used as General Revenue. 
We have demonstrated in paragraph A, above, that it 
is not possible to trace the funds. However, for the moment we 
will assume, arguendo, the accounting approved by Judge Dee. 
According to Judge Dee, the $525,000.00 in subdivider 
fees was, in fact, spent for flood control and parks. However, 
the trail stops there. We only know that $525,000.00 was spent 
on flood control and parks on a city-wide basis. There is no 
way to know which specific flood control project or park was 
financed by which specific developer. 
For example, we have no way of knowing if developers 
on the north side of town are subsidizing parks on the south 
side of town. Nor, do we know if the "newcomers" are 
subsidizing parks to be used primarily by "oldtimers." 
It is not sufficient for West Jordan to simply spend 
The Accounting 
tax is only legal if, "the fee so collected [is] used in such a 
way as to benefit demonstrably the subdivision in question." 
Call v. City of West Jordan (Call II), 614 P. 2d 1251, 1259 
(Utah 1980), (emphasis added) That requirement can never be 
satisfied if West Jordan simply spends money on flood control 
and parks on a city-wide basis. 
In Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d J76 (Utah 1982), 
this Court struck down an impact fee of $",000.00 per house. 
The impact fee was to be used as follows: electrical 20%, 
sewage treatment plant expansion 60%, water 20%. This Court 
held that, "a reasonable charge for a specific service is 
permissible; whereas, a general fee that amounts to a revenue 
measure is not." 642 P.2d at 378. 
Any differences between the "impact fee" in Laf=:erty 
and the "subdividers fee" in this case is pure semantic 
hairsplitting. The fee in Lafferty was to be used for water, 
sewer, and electricity. The fee in this case was to be used 
for flood control and parks. 
West Jordan will likely argue that Lafferty is 
distinguishable. In Lafferty the funds were not earmarked. In 
this case, the funds are earmarked for flood control and parks. 
It is true that the cash portion of the subdividers 
fee is designated for "flood control and/or parks and 
recreational facilities.• 4 However, those 
4/ See Appendix A to Brief of Appellant 
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earmarked for anv specific flood control project or any 
specific park project. West Jordan has freely spent the money 
for all types of flood and recreation projects in various parts 
cf the town. 5 
However, it is important to note that sometimes 
land--and not cash--was taken. In those cases, there was 
absolutely no restriction on the use of the funds. The 
ordinance provides that: 
. . . the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven percent of the land 
area of the proposed subdivision to the 
public use for the benefit and use of 
the citizens of the Citl of West Jordan. 
Appendix A to Brief o Appellant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Finally, sometimes West Jordan did not take either 
cash or land. Sometimes the City took labor and materials. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 8.) The statute makes no provioion at 
all for assessing labor and materials. Since there is no 
statutory restriction, the labor and materials were clearly 
taken as a general revenue measure. 
5/ Plaintiff's Fxhibit 10. 
It is clear from this document that all of the seven 
percent subdivider fees are used for general flood control 
needs. There is no evidence of any attempt to link any 
specific flood control project with revenues from any specific 
subdivision. For example, Exhibit 10 shows that revenues from 
the 19 81 subdivisions would likely be used for the Barney's 
Creek Detention Basin project. On the basis of these 
documents, it is entirely possible that some subdividers 
contributed to the Barney's Creek Detention Basin project when 
their own subdivision did not use--and had no impact on--that 
project at all. 
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In summary, the SE'ven percent subdividers tee was r.ct 
restricted in any meaningful sense. Rather, it was intended, 
and has been administered, as a general revenue measure. 
POINT VII 
WEST JORDAN HAS NOT PRODUCED SUFFICIEt:'l' 
EVIDENCE TO PROPERLY EVALUA':':'E EXPENDI-
TURES CN THE "BOOTH PPOPERTY" AND THE 
"BINGHAM CREEK PROJECT 
For the most part, West Jordan relies on glittering 
generalities. West Jordan boasts that it has taken in 
$525, 000. 00 from developers--and spent S 1, 200, 000. 00 in park 
and flood control projects. We have demonstrated in Point VI, 
above, that such general expenditures will not satisfy the 
Banberry test. 
However, West Jordan has identified two specific 
projects--the "Booth Property" and the "Bingham Creek Project." 
Of course, this is the appropriate battlefield. The correct 
analysis is to compare specific projects with specific 
subdivisions. 6 
A. Need for Additional Funds. 
west Jordan claims that the tax of $16, 576. 00 was 
justified because of the "Booth Property" and the "Bingham 
Creek Project." 
§_/ . it is only fair that the fee so collected be 
used in such a way as to benefit demonstrably the subdivision 
in question. Call v. City of West Jordan, (Call II), 614 P.2c 
1257, 1259 (Utah 1980). 
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We have nc doubt that Hest Jordan did spend some 
money on those projects. We also have no doubt that those 
projects were ~n part required by the West Call subdivision. 
Finally, we have no doubt that those projects, to some extent, 
benefited the West Call subdivis~on. 
The problem is that a municipality always provides 
basic services to residents. Indeed, residents are entitled to 
certain basic services by reason of their property tax and 
sales tax. The master has explained that: 
. . . The City has spent money for 
flood control and parks that has come 
from sources other than Flood Control 
and Park Ordinance fees. These other 
funds can come from federal or state 
sources or from general tax revenues. 
The City has not segregated funds from 
these two sources; therefore, the 
accounting records do not reflect which 
source of money is being used when a 
disbursement is being made. The problem 
at this point is, then, that for some 
types of projects, it appears that the 
City is responsible for providing a 
benefit to subdividers from general City 
funds, and that this benefit is not 
properly considered as part of the 
benefit the City is responsible to 
provide individual subdividers for their 
flood control benefit. ~ f) ~ /., V. ,,) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9~ /I,µ./( 53L(l<.2) (l.R.C.~ 
In short, it is not enough for West Jordan to 
identify some projects that happen to be built in the same 
neighborhood as the West Call subdivision. West Jordan must 
also show that these projects were not to have been constructed 
as a part of the City's ongoing municipal services. There is 
not one iota of evidence on this issue. For example, it is 
entirely possible that the park could have--and should 
have--been purchased out of the City's regular revenue sources. 
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Of course, this question sLu.;ld te resclvec cv 
applying the Banberry test. 
(See Point V, above.) 
Tl',at was not d0r.e b'/ v;est .;c.)r,~an 
B. Manner of Allocation. 
West Jordan claims that the appellant's subdivisiot' 
created additional needs for the community. Therefore, \\est 
Jordan allocates the entire tax of $i6,576.0C' to the "Booth 
Property" and the "Bingham Creek Project." 
However, this type of allocation cannot be made it' a 
vacuum. For example, West Jordan presumes that the appellant'~ 
subdivision has created one hundred percent of the need for 
additional parks and flood control; and, West Jordan further 
presumes that appellant's subdivision will get one hundred 
percent of the benefit; and, that appellant's subdivision 
should pay one hundred percent of the cost. 
Of course, that is completely ridiculous. (R. 1558). 
For example, there are two subdivisions presently adjoining the 
"Booth Property" park. However, there is room for a cczen new 
subdivisions to be built in that area in the future. (Compare 
R. 1558 and defendant's Exhibit 1.) Apparently, West Jordan 
wants to allocate one hundred percent of the cost o~ the "Booth 
Property" to appellant's subdivision. Then, all of the future 
subdivisions would get a "free ride." 
The same thing can be said of the "I"ingharn Creek 
Project". West Jordan wants to allocate the entire $lfi,565.00 
to the "Bingham Creek Project." That actinn entirely ignores 
all of the other subdivisions which live alollc; Bingham Creek 
fbe r .. 'ounting 
and ·~ori::r1bute to the flood control problem. (R. 1618-1619). 
It again appears that West Jordan wants to apportion all of the 
ccsi::s to existing subdividers. Future subdividers will get a 
"free ride." (R. 1619-1620) 
C. Time of Allocation. 
By hindsight, West Jordan now claims that the 
$:6,565.00 was used for the "Bingham Creek ProJect." However, 
there are no contemporaneous records to show how the money was 
intended to be used when it was paid in 197 7. We learn from 
Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982), that: 
The validity of a fee imposed to augment 
general revenues is determined by its 
legal status at the time it is exacted, 
without regard to how the funds are 
later allocated or spent. 
Astonishingly, West Jordan purchased the "Booth 
Property" before Call ever paid the $16,576.00. (Compare R. 90 
and R. 549.) West Jordan tries to wiggle out cf this dilemma 
by stating that this expenditure was made, "in anticipation of 
the \lest Call subdivision .. However, there is absolutely 
no evidence to support that bald assertion. (Cf. R. 547 and 
548) 
D. Source of Funds. 
\'!est Jordan's allocations presume that the 516,565.00 
from West Call was in fact usect fer the "Booth Property" and 
the "Bingham Creek Project." However, there is no evidence to 
oupport that conclusion. 
We know that viest Jordan did spend some money for the 
"Booth Property" and for the "Bingham Creek Project." However, 
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we have no way of knowing whether the $16,565.00 from Call was 
used for those purposes or to buy a new car £or the mayor. 7 
(R. 1728-1729; Compare Plaintiff's Exhibit 9; See also Point 
VI (A) , above.) 
E. Banberry Requirements. 
Even if West Jordan survives all of the other 
problems (Paragraphs A-D, above), the greatest hurdle remains. 
West Jordan cannot simply take money from Call fer 
the general purpose of parks and flood control Nor, can West 
Jordan take money from Call for the purpose of a specific park 
or a specific flood control project. 
The tax is only legal if the "municipal fees 
pertaining to newly developed properties do not require them to 
bear more than their equitable share of capital costs (in 
comparison with other properties), in relation to benefits 
conferred." Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 
1982) . 
This Court has given a specific formula to make that 
comparison. Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1981). (See Point III, above.) In 
this case, West Jordan has the burden of coming forth with the 
evidence. West Jordan simply claims it has spent scme money on 
21 West Jordan argues that Call' s expert retreated from his 
opinion that the money might have been used for a new car for 
the mayor. Respondents Brief, at p. 16. However, West Jordan 
simply mistates the record. Call' s eYpert did not in any way 
retreat from that opinion. (R. 1748-1749) 
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sorr:P projects; yet, West Jordan did not present one iota of 
evidence to respond to the Banberry formula. Thus, we cannot 
know if the allocations for the "Bingham Creek Project, and the 
"Booth Property" met the Banberry test. 
POINT VIII 
WEST JORDAN'S SO-CALLED 
ACCOUNTING IS WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Call's opening brief gives three separate reasons why 
West Jordan must account for the seven percent subdivider fees. 
(Brief of Appellant, Point I) 
West Jordan's brief gives a short terse response to 
this critical issue. West Jordan states: 
Did the City account for those monies so 
collected? Yes. The aforementioned 
documents attest the appropriate 
accounting controls were present. 
Respondents Brief, at p. 16. 
That brief response totally ignores the testimony of 
Call's expert. Jerry Sharkey, a C.P.A., testified that West 
Jordan's documents do not account for the funds. (R. 1729) 
West Jordan's response also ignores the work of the 
special master8 who explained that the financial records do 
not contain a proper accounting: 
After I find a general description of 
the transaction provided in Step l, I 
81 West Jordan states that Call "expressly waived" the final 
master's report. However, that was with good reason. Call was 
faced with the prospect of paying $18,900.00 fer the final 
master's report. However, the burden to provide that evidence 
was on West Jordan. __ \R. 727-:7_29) _-./ · ~ ~
- I .·f)_,·J:J..· ./Jv. ../< nd1.·n
1
"f- 1 f AC/.vr' -i. A._ . _. 
-I t)A..I ~'~Y' 4' /'r) c..(flJ un.tAT . '· ', ,,-,4 ,,,tlpfl.-f . / 
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will need to deterrn:Cr:e wLo bei;,,· -_ t cc! 
from each individual transactiLn. Frnrn 
the sample tests above, know that 
often the accounting records do not 
provide an eYplanation ci the individual 
benefits to subdividers. For example, 
from the accounting records, I have no 
way of knowing who benefiteo from the 
$10,000.00 payment for the 2~00 West 
storm drain. To determine the 
individual subdivider' s benefi ~ ~tom 
this type of transaction, I wi'.l need 
the help of an engineer who is competent 
in flood control systems and pc.rk 
planr.ing. With engineering help, I 
believe an allocation of these ~cint 
benefits can be made to individual 
subdividers; however, various subjective 
decisions would have to be made from the 
facts available on each transaction. 
Also, such an analysis would require a 
review of all related transactions in 
each fiscal year. I do not believe that 
a single subdivider can be examined 
individually. 
*** 
to accomplish Step 3, I would have tc 
determine if any general City obligation 
for benefit to subdividers existed for 
each flood control and park transaction 
and project. Since the information is 
not provided in the existing accoum:.:cna 
records, it will have tc come from other 
records and, again, the help of a 
trained engineer. It is also possible 
that such information may not be 
available at all for some transactions; 
cherefore, the analysis would not be 
possible. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, emphasis 
added.) 
Furthermore, the master has explainec! that West 
Jordan has violated state law by failing to se~arate the 
subdivider fees: 
First, Section 10-10-29 [Utah Code 
Annotated] Fmms TO BE ESTABLISHED of 
the Act states that "Each City sLall 
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~0rre c.r all ot the following funds or 
ledgers in its svstem ot accounts: 
1 !'aragraph 1 " i ) A ledger or group of 
accounts in which to record the details 
relatir.g +:o the general fixed assets of 
the municipality." West Jordan City did 
net ma1nta1n a property ledger until 
recently, however, within the scope of 
this suP1ey I could not determine its 
accuracy related to prior transactions. 
Second, Paragraph (2) of 
Section :c-10-29 [Utah Code Anno1:ated] 
also requires a City to maintain 
"Special revenue funds, as required, 
such as a fund financed by a 
special-purpcse tax being earmarked :or 
a specific purpose," and paragraph (4) 
requires . capital improvement 
funds to otherwise account for funds 
allotted annually to specific 
construction or improvement projects 
derived from sources other than the 
proceeds of general obligation bond 
issues or general long-tenn debt." 
Neither of these paragraphs are 
exactly related to the accounting 
problem of flood control and parks fees, 
however, I think that they both provide 
guidance on the proper method of 
recording these transactions. First, 
while these fees may not be taxes, I 
think they are within the theme of 
paragraph ( 2) in that they are for a 
special purpose and earmarked 
specifically for that purpose. 
Secondly, these fees were collected for 
flood control and parks construction or 
improvement prc'ects, therefore, 
paragraph ( 4) seems to apply. The City 
has recorded these transactions as 
year-to-year revenue and expenditures 
and has not given them special 
accounting treatment. 
With the guidance of paragraphs 
(2), (4) and (9) of Section 10-10-29 
[Utah Cede Annotated], I conclude that 
the fees should have had special 
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accounting treatment. First, think 
the City should have prepared a fixed 
asset ledger that recorded a description 
of all fixed assets purchased, dilte of 
purchase, cost and any other applicable 
information. This ledger should also 
have included the property received as 
Flood Control and Parks Ordinance Fees. 
Secondly, I think that the Flood Control 
and Parks Fee receipts should have been 
recorded directly into a restricted 
equity account within the general fund, 
which would represent earmarked funds 
for flood control and parks. As the 
City determined allowable uses for these 
funds they should have made a transfer 
from the restricted equity account to a 
revenue account. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 9. 
West Jordan says that its financial records contain a 
complete accounting. Yet, those records are riddled with 
deficiencies: 
General fixed assets have been acquired 
for general city purposes and at the 
time of purchase were recorded as 
expenditures in the General Fund or the 
Capital Improvements Fund of the City. 
However, the City has not maintained a 
record of its general fixed assets and, 
accordingly, a statement of general 
fixed assets, required by generally 
accepted accounting principles is not 
included in the financial statements. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 at p. 14 
(General Fixed assets) . 
*** 
As a result of not maintaining detailed 
records, the Water and Sewer Fund has 
not been able to determine the cost of 
assets retired and, accordingly, such 
assets have not been removed from the 
Water and Sewer Fund's accounting 
records. The amount of such assets, and 
the effect on the financial statements 
of the Water and Sewer Fund, is not 
determinable at June 30, 1980. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 at p. 16 
(Utility Plant in Service) 
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*** 
As discussed in Note 1, the City has not 
maintained detailed records related to 
its general fixed assets. This is in 
violation of the State of Utah Fiscal 
Procedures Act and not in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
Also, as discussed in t'ote 9, 
$720, 000. 00 of water and sewer 
connection fees which were restricted 
for use in improving the utility plan in 
service, were transferred to other funds 
for use other than improvements to the 
water and sewer utility plant in 
service. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 at p. 17 
(Legal Compliance) . 
In summary, West Jordan has a clear duty to render an 
accounting. However, West Jordan has intermingled the funds 
wi~h general City funds. West Jordan's notion of an accounting 
is to simply hand over a batch of unsorted check vouchers 
(Detendant's Exhibit 24), and leave Call to sort cut the 
mess. 9 That may be an accounting of sorts; however, it falls 
well short of satisfying the fiduciary and constitutional 
safeguards: 
9/ 
if money is collected from the 
public for a specific purpose, it 
becomes a trust fund committed tc the 
carrying out of that purpose. 
Call v. City of West Jordan (Call I), 
606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) 
West Jordan's entire accounting is contained in 
defendant's Exhibit 24. The Court should physically look 
through that exhibit. It will be immediately apparent that the 
so-caliec accounting is a farce. 
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POitlT IX 
THE CASE SHOULD 5E 
CERTIFIED AS A CLASS 
ACTION. 
A. Size of the Class 
Call' s opening brief argues that the size of the 
class (approximately 100) ' is sufficient to satisfy 
Rule 23(a) (1) U.R.C.P.lO 
west Jordan does not oppose the estinated size of the 
class. 11 West Jordan simply argues that a class of 
approximately 100 members is too small. 
West Jordan does not cite any cases in support of its 
position. Nor, does West Jordan attempt to distinguish any of 
the cases cited by Call. West Jordan simply makes a naked 
dogmatic argument. 
If it were helpful, Call could go on and cite 
numerous other cases where classes of less than 100 me:o:mbers 
were certified; e.g.: 
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. 
Anaconaa American Brass, 43 
F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968), 
(Class of 25 members 
certified); Sabala v. Western 
Gillette Inc., 362 F. Supp. 
1142 (s.D. '!'ex. 1973); (Class 
of 26 members certified); 
l.Q./ One or more melT'bers of a class may sue er be sued a.s 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 
(Rule 23(a) (1)) U.R.C.P.) 
QI We know that there were "73 class 
October 31, 1980. (R. 191-192) Presumably, 
were added after that time. 
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more subdivisions 
Clciss ~ s.=ues 
Walls v. Bank of Greenwood, 20 Fed R. 
Serv.2d 112 (N.D. Ms. 1975); (Class of 
23 melt'.bers certified); !lorn v. 
i\ssociated \\holesale Grocers Inc., 555 
F. 2d 270 (10th Cir. 1977); (Reversal of 
denial of class of 46); King v. Cai.ev, 
405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. N.Y. 1975); (Class 
of 38 members certified.) 
Nor, is it necessary for the plaintiff to know the 
exact number or identity of the class members. Carpenter v. 
Davis, 424 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1970); Tober v. Chanita Inc., 
58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pe .. 1973); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical 
Cer,ter, Inc. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975) 
In Butkis v. Chicken Unlimited Enterprises, 15 Fed R. 
Serv.2d 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1971), the Court approved a class of 35 
members and noted, "the difficulties involved in having 
thirty-five intervenors, all with their respective attorneys, 
attempt to go through the formal motions required for entrance 
into and participation in the suit." 
If the class is not certified, what will happen? In 
School District of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, 
267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967)' defendants 
successfully opposed class certification. Subsequently, more 
than 40 individual suits were filed in 8 judicial districts. 
In the later case of State of Illinois v. Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the Court 
noted that an unnecessary waste of judicial resources could 
have been avoided if the class had been certified in the first 
place. 
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B. Interest of Class Members 
West Jordan argues that this should not be a class 
action because the other class members simply don't care abcut 
the case. Again, West Jordan fails to cite any authority for 
this position. 
Indeed, this argument assumes that all of the other 
class members know about the lawsuit, and have elected to 
abstain. But, there is no showing that this is the case. 
Moreover, it would be very unlikely for other subdividers to 
turn their backs on an award if they knew the full story. 
It appears that the courts have unanimously rejected 
West Jordan's contention. A case in point is Lanner v. Wimmer, 
662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981) In that case, plaintiffs 
challenged the policy of releasing students from public school 
to attend seminary classes. The trial court certified a class 
consisting of parents. The appellate court upheld class 
certification. The court pointed out that a class could be 
certified even though some members of the class disagreed with 
the litigation. 
In Jacobi v. Bache & Co. Inc., 16 Fed. R. Serv.2d 71, 
73 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), the court certified a class composed of 
employees of certain brokerage houses. The court pointed out 
that: 
The fact that some members of the class 
may differ as to the desirability of a 
particular remedy for the antitrust 
violation, or even desire the 
maintenance of the status quo, does not 
preclude their beinq included within the 
class bringing the action. 
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See alsu: 
ncrwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920* (2d 
Cir. 1968); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns Inc., 1975 Trade Cases 
~60,153* (WD Tn 1975); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 
359* (S.D. N.Y. 1973); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320* (M.D. 
Al. 1973); Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv.2d 71* (S.D. 
t~.Y. 1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173* (E.D. N.Y. 1970); 
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328• 
(S.D. Tx. 1969); Snyder v. Board of Trustees of University of 
Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927* (N.D. Ill 1968); Cf Dierks v. 
Thompson, 414 F.2d 453* (1st Cir. 1969); Housing Auth Omaha 
Nebraska v. U.S. Housing Auth, 54 F.R.D. 402* (D Nb. 1972); Mos~ 
,,_ Lane Co. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 122* (W.D. Va. 1970), affd in part, 
remd in part 471 F.2d 853* (4th Cir. 1973). But see Ward v. 
Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968). 
C. Individual Defenses 
West Jordan states that the class device is not 
appropriate because the City has individual defenses against 
various subdividers. Again, West Jordan cites no authorities. 
West Jordan simply makes bald assertions. 
However, the rule does not require claims of class 
members to be identical. Rather, the rule requires common 
issues (Rule 23 (a) (2)), and typical issues (Rule 23 (a) (3)). 
The "hornbook" law on that issue is that: 
Nowhere in the rule is there a 
requirement that all questions of law 
and fact be common to the class. 
Newberg on Class Actions §lllOd 
33 
Class Issues 
* * * 
Typicality refers to the nature of tr.e 
claim or defense of the class 
representative, and not to the specific 
facts from which it arose or to the 
relief souaht. Factual differences will 
not render-a claim atypical if the claim 
arises from the same event or practice 
or course of conduct that gives rise to 
the claims of class members, and is 
based on the same legal theory. 
Newberg on Class Actions, ~1115c 
* * * 
Thouah at least one court has 
suggested-that differences in the amount 
of damages claimed will make a 
plaintiff's claim atypical, most courts 
have declined even to consider that 
argument, and nearly all of those that 
have ruled on it have rejected it 
outright. If differences in amounts of 
individual damages made a class action 
improper, a class action for damages 
would never be possible . . 
Newberg on Class Actions §1115d 
An excellent example is the case of Coley v. Clinton, 
635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980). In that case, plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of corrunitment proceedings. 
The trial court denied class certification. The appellate 
court reversed. The appellate court reasoned that, where the 
constitutionality of the procedures provided a corrIDon question 
of law for all class members, it was no bar to certification 
that remedies might have to be individually tailored. See 
also: Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Milonas v. 
Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982); Stallings v. Califano, 
86 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Petty v. Peoples Gas Light & 
Coke Co., 86 F.R.D. 336 (1979). 
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D. Notice of Claim 
West Jordan claims that it has a unique defense 
against the unnamed class members because they did not file a 
"notice of Claim" pursuant to §63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 12 
However, this is not the type of case that requires a 
notice of claim. It was never necessary for Call or any other 
class member to file a notice of claim. El Rancho Enterprises 
Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778 {U~ah 1977). 
E. Timeliness of the Motion 
West Jordan complains that Call is not entitled to 
renew the claim for class certification. 
It is true that Call has been persistent. However, a 
motion for class certification is always interlocutory. 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 N.11 (1978), 
57 L.Ed.2d 351, 98 S.Ct. 2454,. Thus, there is no reason why 
Call could not--and should not--renew the motion at different 
stages of the proceedings. 13 
QI This argument is raised for the first time 
It was never considered by the trial court. 
on appeal. 
lJ.I The trial court should enter findings when ruling on the 
class issue. 
127, 
{9th 
693, 
Judge Winder and Judge Banks failed to make findings. (R. 
463) Compare Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177 
Cir. 1974); Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 68 L.Ed.2d 
101 S.Ct. 2193 (1981). 
Judge Dee made only perfunctory findings which parrot the 
rule. (R. 1507-1508) 
35 
Class Issues 
Finally, the issue is properly presented in this 
court for, "an order denying class certification is subject to 
effective review after final judgment at the behest of the 
named plaintiff." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
469; 98 s.ct. 2454, 2458; 57 L.Ed.2d 351, 358 (1978). 
F. Common Issues 
This case should be certified as a class actior. 
because all of the subdividers are in the same boat. They all 
lost money pursuant to the same municipal ordinance. 
cases, the money was mixed with the general fund. 
The master has testified that: 
Also such an analysis would require a 
review of all related transactions in 
each fiscal year. I do not believe that 
a single subdivider can be examined 
individually. 
(R. 437.) 
In all 
Thus, there is no practical alternative to a class action. Any 
analysis must, perforce, include all subdivisions. Any 
decision for Call will necessarily involve all other 
subdividers. 
In short, this case became a class action on the day 
that West Jordan violated state law and violated its fiduciary 
duty by intermingling the funds. 
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SUMMARY 
What will happen if Call wins? The sky will not 
fall. West Jordan will not lose a single park or a single 
flood control project. 
What will happen is simply that- West Jordan will 
refund the money to the subdividers. Next, West Jordar will 
float a bond issue to refinance the improvements. 
The end result will be a redistribution of the costs. 
Those costs now rest on the shoulders of- approximately 100 
subdividers. After refinancing by a bond issue, the burden 
will fall equally on all citizens of West Jordan. 
DATED this day of -~(.~-e_1_'2_· __ , 1984. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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